Belief functions combination without the assumption of independence of the information sources  by Cattaneo, Marco E.G.V.
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 299–315
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
j ou rna l homepage : www . e l s e v i e r . c om / l o c a t e / i j a r
Belief functions combination without the assumption of independence
of the information sources
Marco E.G.V. Cattaneo ∗
Department of Statistics, LMU Munich, Ludwigstraße 33, 80539 München, Germany
A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T
Article history:
Available online 9 November 2010
Keywords:
Dempster–Shafer theory
Belief functions
Combination rule
Dependence
Conflict
Cautious combination
This paper considers the problem of combining belief functions obtained fromnot necessar-
ily independent sources of information. It introduces two combination rules for the situation
inwhichnoassumption ismadeabout thedependenceof the information sources. These two
rules are based on cautious combinations of plausibility and commonality functions, respec-
tively. The paper studies the properties of these rules and their connection with Dempster’s
rules of conditioning and combination and the minimum rule of possibility theory.
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1. Introduction
Acentral themeofDempster–Shafer theory [41,53] is the combination of the information obtained fromdifferent sources.
The information obtained from a source is described by a belief function, and the belief functions corresponding to inde-
pendent sources of information can be combined by means of Dempster’s rule. The problem is that it is usually not clear
if Dempster’s rule is applicable, because the meaning of the independence of the information sources is very abstract (this
holds for all interpretations of belief functions).
Dempster–Shafer theory allows the description of partial or complete ignorance, since the belief not accorded to a
proposition does not have to be accorded to the negation of that proposition. Hence, it is fully in the spirit of the theory to
allow ignorance also about the dependence of the information sources: the present paper studies the combination of belief
functions in the extreme case of complete ignorance about the dependence of the information sources. Several combination
rules have been recently suggested for that extreme case: the rule proposed by Cattaneo [1] replaces the independence
assumption with an assumption of maximal consistency (that is, minimal conflict), but is computationally too demanding
for many applications; the rule studied by Denœux [11] (based on the concept of weight of evidence) satisfies important
properties, but has some difficulties with non-separable belief functions; finally, the rule suggested by Destercke et al. [13]
generalizes the minimum rule of possibility theory, but does not respect the fundamental equivalence between belief
functions and their vacuous extensions. The combination rules proposed in the present paper are closely related to these
three rules, without being subject to the above weaknesses.
An example of a situation in which the assumption of independence of the information sources leads to absurd results
is the generalization of Bayes’ theorem studied in [1, Section 5] (see also [46, Section 5.2]). In fact, in that situation the
conflict of the combination appears to play the role of a measure of disagreement between the involved belief functions,
and the conflict of Dempster’s rule is not a good measure of disagreement (see for instance [34]). A much better measure
of disagreement among belief functions is the minimal conflict defined in Section 2 of the present paper. More generally,
Section 2 contains somemathematical definitions and results, in particular on specializations of belief functions and on two
classes of Fréchet bounds. The proofs of the theorems are given in Appendix A.
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In general, the information sources cannot be independent, because the pieces of information obtained from them are
about the same topic, and the independence assumption can thus lead to partial inconsistency (that is, conflict). Hence,
the result of Dempster’s rule should be interpreted as an approximation by a belief function of the conflictual combination
actually resulting from the independence assumption. This is the subject of Section 3, and is important for the justification
of the combination rules proposed in Section 5 for the situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence of
the information sources, since the results of those rules are approximations by belief functions ofmost cautious descriptions
of the combined information. The rules of Section 5 satisfy many important properties, discussed in Section 4 in relation to
the vast literature on combination rules for belief functions.
2. Some mathematical definitions and results
Let S be a finite, nonempty set. The complement of A ⊆ S in S is denoted by A, while 2A and |A| denote the power set
and the cardinality of A, respectively. An ordered partition of A ⊆ S into n ≥ 1 subsets is an n-tuple (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ (2A)n of
pairwise disjoint subsets of Awhose union is A (note that the non-emptiness of the Bi’s is not assumed). LetOPn(A) denote
the set of all ordered partitions of A into n subsets.
A function μ : 2S → [0, 1] is said to be monotonic if A ⊆ B ⊆ S implies μ(A) ≤ μ(B), while μ is said to be anti-
monotonic if A ⊆ B ⊆ S implies μ(A) ≥ μ(B); moreover, μ is said to be subadditive if μ(A ∪ B) ≤ μ(A) + μ(B) for all
disjoint A, B ⊆ S, while μ is said to be quasi-superadditive if μ(A ∪ B) ≥ μ(A) + μ(B) − 1 for all disjoint A, B ⊆ S; finally,
μ is said to be 2-alternating if μ(A ∪ B) + μ(A ∩ B) ≤ μ(A) + μ(B) for all A, B ⊆ S. LetMS0(S) denote the set of all
monotonic, subadditive functions μ : 2S → [0, 1] with μ(∅) = 0; and let AQ1(S) denote the set of all anti-monotonic,
quasi-superadditive functions μ : 2S → [0, 1] with μ(∅) = 1.
A basic belief assignment (bba) is a functionm : 2S → [0, 1] such that∑A⊆S m(A) = 1. The valuem(A) is the total belief
mass assigned to A (without being assigned to any proper subset of A). The conflict of a bbam is the total belief massm(∅)
assigned to the empty set. A bbam is said to be normal if it has no conflict (that is,m(∅) = 0). A bbamwithm(∅) < 1 can
be normalized by settingm(∅) to 0 and rescaling the resulting function on 2S to a bba.
The belief function Bel : 2S → [0, 1], plausibility function Pl : 2S → [0, 1], and commonality function Q : 2S → [0, 1]
associated with a bbam on 2S satisfy
Bel(A) = ∑
B⊆A:
B 	=∅
m(B), Pl(A) = ∑
B⊆S:
A∩B 	=∅
m(B), and Q(A) = ∑
B⊆S:
A⊆B
m(B),
respectively, for all A ⊆ S. The value Bel(A) is the total non-conflictual beliefmass assigned to A or its subsets, while the value
Pl(A) is the total belief mass not assigned to A or its subsets. Hence, Bel ≤ Pl (in this paper, expressions involving functions
without explicit arguments are to be interpreted pointwise), Bel(∅) = Pl(∅) = 0, and Bel(A) + Pl(A) = 1 − m(∅) for all
A ⊆ S. Moreover, Pl ∈ MS0(S) and Pl is 2-alternating, while Q ∈ AQ1(S) and Q satisfies∑A⊆S(−1)|A| Q(A) = m(∅) (see
for example [41, p. 42]). When mx is a bba, then Belx , Plx , and Qx denote the belief, plausibility, and commonality functions
associated withmx , respectively.
A refinement of S is a pair (R, r) where R is a finite set and r : S → 2R\{∅} is a mapping such that the images of the
elements of S are pairwise disjoint and their union is R (that is, the images of the elements of S build a nonempty partition
of R). When m is a bba on 2S and (R, r) is a refinement of S, the vacuous extension of m to 2R by means of r is the bba
m↑(R,r) on 2R such that m↑(R,r)(∅) = m(∅) and m↑(R,r) (⋃x∈A r(x)) = m(A) for all nonempty A ⊆ S. The plausibility
and commonality functions associated with m↑(R,r) are Pl ◦ r˜ and Q ◦ r˜, respectively, where r˜ : 2R → 2S is defined by
r˜(A) = {x ∈ S : r(x) ∩ A 	= ∅} for all A ⊆ R.
The focal sets of a bbam on 2S are the A ⊆ S such thatm(A) > 0. The core C(m) of a bbam on 2S is the union of its focal
sets; that is, C(m) is the smallest A ⊆ S such that Pl(A) = 0. A bba m is said to be consonant if its focal sets are nested.
The contour function π : S → [0, 1] associated with a consonant bba m on 2S satisfies π(x) = Pl({x}) = Q({x}) for all
x ∈ S; therefore, Pl(A) = maxx∈A π(x) and Q(A) = minx∈A π(x), for all nonempty A ⊆ S. The simple bba mA,α on 2S is the
consonant bba defined by mA,α(A) = α and mA,α(S) = 1 − α, where A ⊂ S and α ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, mA,0 does not
depend on A, and is called the vacuous bba on 2S .
2.1. Joint belief assignments and specializations
Letm1, . . . ,mn be n ≥ 1 bba’s on 2S . A joint belief assignment (jba)with marginalsm1, . . . ,mn is a function J : (2S)n →[0, 1] such that
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S:
Bi=A
J(B1, . . . , Bn) = mi(A)
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for all A ⊆ S and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (hence, in particular,∑B1,...,Bn⊆S J(B1, . . . , Bn) = 1). Let J (m1, . . . ,mn) denote the set
of all jba’s with marginalsm1, . . . ,mn. A jba J on (2
S)n induces a bbamJ on 2
S defined by
mJ(A) =
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S:
B1∩···∩Bn=A
J(B1, . . . , Bn)
for all A ⊆ S. The induced bbamJ is obtained from J by assigning the belief mass J(B1, . . . , Bn) to the set B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn, for
all B1, . . . , Bn ⊆ S.
A bbam on 2S can be interpreted as the probability distribution of a random subset X of Swith respect to some probability
measure P, where (,A, P) is some underlying probability space and X :  → 2S is a random object. The bbam is normal
if and only if X is nonempty a.s. (that is, P{X 	= ∅} = 1), and normalizing m corresponds to conditioning P on {X 	= ∅}.
With this interpretation, Bel(A) = P{X ⊆ A, X 	= ∅}, Pl(A) = P{X ∩ A 	= ∅}, and Q(A) = P{A ⊆ X}, for all A ⊆ S.
If the bba’s m1, . . . ,mn on 2
S are interpreted as the probability distributions of the random subsets X1, . . . , Xn of S,
respectively, then the jba’s J ∈ J (m1, . . . ,mn) correspond to the possible joint probability distributions of X1, . . . , Xn, and
mJ to the resulting probability distribution of X1 ∩ · · · ∩ Xn. In particular, the jba I corresponding to the independence of
X1, . . . , Xn is defined by I(B1, . . . , Bn) = m1(B1) · · ·mn(Bn) for all B1, . . . , Bn ⊆ S; in this case, the commonality function
QI associated with the induced bbamI satisfies, for all A ⊆ S,
QI(A) = P{A ⊆ X1 ∩ · · · ∩ Xn} = P{A ⊆ X1} · · · P{A ⊆ Xn} = Q1(A) · · ·Qn(A). (1)
A bbams on 2
S is a specialization of a bbam on 2S if there is a jba J ∈ J (ms,m) such that J(Bs, B) > 0 implies Bs ⊆ B, for
all Bs, B ⊆ S. In this case,mJ = ms, because
mJ(A) =
∑
Bs,B⊆S:
Bs∩B=A
J(Bs, B) =
∑
Bs,B⊆S:
Bs=A
J(Bs, B) = ms(A)
for all A ⊆ S. Hence, a specialization of a bba on 2S is obtained by transferring some belief mass from A to some of its subsets,
for all A ⊆ S. As a consequence, ifms is a specialization ofm, then Pls ≤ Pl and Qs ≤ Q , and all specializations ofms are also
specializations ofm.
Let S(m) denote the set of all specializations of a bbam. It can be easily proved that
Pl = max
ms∈S(m)
Bels and Q = max
ms∈S(m)
ms. (2)
Hence, for each A ⊆ S, the value Pl(A) is the maximum amount of non-conflictual belief mass that can be assigned to A or
its subsets by specializingm, while Q(A) is the maximum amount of belief mass that can be assigned to A by specializingm.
The following result points out the strong relationship between common specializations and jba’s.
Theorem 1. Let m1, . . . ,mn be n ≥ 1 bba’s on 2S. A bba on 2S is a common specialization of m1, . . . ,mn if and only if it is a
specialization of a bba mJ induced by some jba J with marginals m1, . . . ,mn; that is,
S(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ S(mn) =
⋃
J∈J (m1,...,mn)
S(mJ).
2.2. Two binary operators
The binary operatorsuprise and ∧ on the set of all real functions on 2S are defined by
(μuprise ν)(A) = min
B⊆A (μ(B) + ν(A \ B)) and (μ ∧ ν)(A) = min {μ(A), ν(A)} ,
respectively, for all A ⊆ S and all real functions μ, ν on 2S . It can be easily checked that uprise and ∧ are commutative and
associative, with
(μ1 uprise · · ·uprise μn)(A) = min
(B1,...,Bn)∈OPn(A)
(μ1(B1) + · · · + μn(Bn)) and
(μ1 ∧ · · · ∧ μn)(A) = min {μ1(A), . . . , μn(A)} ,
for all n ≥ 1, all A ⊆ S, and all real functions μ1, . . . , μn on 2S . Hence, in particular,
μ1 uprise · · ·uprise μn ≤ μ1 ∧ · · · ∧ μn
for all n ≥ 1 and all real functions μ1, . . . , μn on 2S such that μ1(∅) = · · · = μn(∅) = 0. That is, μ1 uprise · · · uprise μn is
bounded above by the pointwise minimum of μ1, . . . , μn, if μ1(∅) = · · · = μn(∅) = 0, and this is the case in particular
when μ1, . . . , μn ∈ MS0(S).
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Theorem 2. uprise is a commutative and associative binary operator onMS0(S). Moreover, for all μ, ν ∈ MS0(S), if (R, r) is a
refinement of S, then (μ ◦ r˜)uprise (ν ◦ r˜) = (μuprise ν) ◦ r˜; and if μ ≤ ν , then μuprise ν = μ.
The following simple result is an analogue of Theorem 2 for the pointwise minimum operator∧.
Theorem 3. ∧ is a commutative and associative binary operator on AQ1(S). Moreover, for all μ, ν ∈ AQ1(S), if (R, r) is a
refinement of S, then (μ ◦ r˜) ∧ (ν ◦ r˜) = (μ ∧ ν) ◦ r˜; and if μ ≤ ν , then μ ∧ ν = μ.
2.3. Fréchet bounds
Letm1, . . . ,mn ben ≥ 1bba’s on2S and letAbea subset of S. Ifm1, . . . ,mn are interpretedas theprobabilitydistributions
of the random subsets X1, . . . , Xn of S, respectively, then
max
J∈J (m1,...,mn)
PlJ(A) and max
J∈J (m1,...,mn)
QJ(A) (3)
are the maximum values of P{X1 ∩ · · · ∩ Xn ∩ A 	= ∅} and P{A ⊆ X1 ∩ · · · ∩ Xn}, respectively, over all possible joint
probability distributions of X1, . . . , Xn. Suchmaxima are called Fréchet bounds in probability theory (see for example [39]).
The following theorem states in particular that (Pl1 uprise · · · uprise Pln)(A) corresponds to the first of the two Fréchet bounds (3)
when n ≤ 2, and bounds it from above when n ≥ 3.
Theorem 4. If m1, . . . ,mn are n ≥ 1 bba’s on 2S, then
max
J∈J (m1,...,mn)
PlJ = max
ms∈S(m1)∩···∩S(mn)
Pls ≤ Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln.
Moreover, the above inequality is actually an equality when n ≤ 2; that is, in particular,
max
J∈J (m1,m2)
PlJ = max
ms∈S(m1)∩S(m2)
Pls = Pl1 uprise Pl2.
The equality between the first of the two Fréchet bounds (3) and (Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln)(A) when n ≤ 2 can be deduced from
a theorem by Strassen [49, Theorem 11], who noted that his theorem cannot be straightforwardly extended to the case with
n ≥ 3 (see also [44]). In fact, the following counterexample implies that for no n ≥ 3 the inequality in the first part of
Theorem 4 is always an equality.
Example 1. Choose n ≥ 3 and define S = {1, . . . , n}. For each i ∈ S let mi be the bba on 2S assigning the belief mass 12 to
both the singleton {i} and its complement; that is,mi({i}) = mi({i}) = 12 for all i ∈ S.
Then (Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln)(S) = 1, becausem1, . . . ,mn are normal and Pli(A) ≥ 12 for all nonempty A ⊂ S and all i ∈ S. But
ifms is a common specialization ofm1, . . . ,mn, thenms can assign belief mass only to the n singletons and to∅, and it can
be easily checked that Pls(S) is maximal whenms({i}) = 12 1n−1 for all i ∈ S. Therefore,
max
J∈J (m1,...,mn)
PlJ(S) = max
ms∈S(m1)∩···∩S(mn)
Pls(S) = 12 nn−1 ≤ 34 < 1 = (Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln)(S).
In spite of the simplicity of Example 1, no difference betweenmaxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ and Pl1uprise · · ·uprise Pln has been observed
in thousands of randomly generated numerical examples (with various generating probability distributions). This suggests
that in general (Pl1uprise · · ·uprise Pln)(A) is a very good upper approximation of the first of the two Fréchet bounds (3). The second
one is simpler: it corresponds to (Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn)(A), as implied by the following result.
Theorem 5. If m1, . . . ,mn are n ≥ 1 bba’s on 2S, then
max
J∈J (m1,...,mn)
QJ = max
ms∈S(m1)∩···∩S(mn)
Qs = Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn.
2.4. Minimal conflict
Theminimal conflict of n ≥ 1 bba’sm1, . . . ,mn on 2S is the value
cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = min
J∈J (m1,...,mn)
mJ(∅) = min
ms∈S(m1)∩···∩S(mn)
ms(∅),
where the second equality is implied by Theorem 4, sincem(∅) = 1 − Pl(S). Hence, Theorem 4 implies also
cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) ≥ 1 − (Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln)(S) = max
(B1,...,Bn)∈OPn(S)
(1 − Pl1(B1) − · · · − Pln(Bn)) .
As noted above, in general 1 − (Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln)(S) seems to be a very good lower approximation of cmin(m1, . . . ,mn).
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The second part of Theorem 4 implies that the minimal conflict of the bba’sm1,m2 on 2
S is 1 − (Pl1 uprise Pl2)(S); that is,
cmin(m1,m2) = m1(∅) + max
A⊆S (Bel1(A) − Pl2(A)) . (4)
In the casewith |S| a power of 2 andm1,m2 normal, the expression (4) was proved directly in [1, Proposition 2]. The equality
between the first of the two Fréchet bounds (3) and (Pl1uprise · · ·uprise Pln)(A)when n ≤ 2 can be easily deduced from this result.
The minimal conflict cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ [0, 1] can be interpreted as a measure of disagreement between the bba’s
m1, . . . ,mn. The following theorem collects some important properties of this measure of disagreement.
Theorem 6. Let m1, . . . ,mn be n ≥ 1 bba’s on 2S. Then cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 0 if and only if m1, . . . ,mn have a common
normal specialization; while cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 1 if and only if C(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ C(mn) = ∅. If (R, r) is a refinement of S, then
cmin(m
↑(R,r)
1 , . . . ,m
↑(R,r)
n ) = cmin(m1, . . . ,mn).
Moreover, if n ≥ 2 and m1 is a specialization of mn, then cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = cmin(m1, . . . ,mn−1); and in particular, if m1 is
a common specialization of m2, . . . ,mn, then cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = m1(∅).
Theorem 6 implies in particular that if cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 0, then m1, . . . ,mn are normal and Bel1 ∨ · · · ∨ Beln ≤
Pl1∧· · ·∧Pln (where∨denotes the pointwisemaximumoperator), sincem1, . . . ,mn have a commonnormal specialization.
The converse holds when n ≤ 2, as follows from the expression (4); but the following counterexample implies that it does
not hold for any n ≥ 3.
Example 2. In the situation of Example 1,m1, . . . ,mn are normal and Bel1 ∨ · · · ∨ Beln ≤ Pl1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pln, since
(Bel1 ∨ · · · ∨ Beln) (A) = (Pl1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pln) (A) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if A = ∅,
1 if A = S,
1
2
otherwise.
Therefore, cmin(mi,mj) = cmin(mi) = 0 for all i, j ∈ S; but cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 1 − 12 nn−1 ≥ 14 > 0.
3. On the assumption of independence of the information sources
In Dempster–Shafer theory, a piece of information about the uncertain value of x ∈ S is usually described by a normal bba
m on 2S: for each A ⊆ S, the valuem(A) is the total belief mass assigned to the proposition “x ∈ A” without being assigned to
any more specific proposition. A central theme of the theory is the combination of the information obtained from different
sources; that is, the combination of several normal bba’s on 2S (describing the information obtained from different sources)
into a single normal bba on 2S (describing the combined information).
If the normal bba’s m1, . . . ,mn on 2
S are interpreted as the probability distributions of the random subsets
X1, . . . , Xn of S, respectively (that is, the beliefmasses are interpreted probabilistically), then the combination ofm1, . . . ,mn
is theprobability distributionofX1∩· · ·∩Xn. Thepossible joint probability distributions ofX1, . . . , Xn correspond to the jba’s
J ∈ J (m1, . . . ,mn), and the resulting combination ofm1, . . . ,mn ismJ . In particular, when the independence of X1, . . . , Xn
is assumed, the combination ofm1, . . . ,mn ismI (where I ∈ J (m1, . . . ,mn) is the jba corresponding to the independence
of X1, . . . , Xn), but mI can be non-normal. Normalizing mI corresponds to conditioning on {X1 ∩ · · · ∩ Xn 	= ∅}, but in
general X1, . . . , Xn are not independent anymore when conditioned on {X1 ∩ · · · ∩ Xn 	= ∅}. Hence, the independence
assumption and the normality of the combination are not compatible in general.
3.1. On the possibility of independence
Dempster [8] interpreted the belief masses probabilistically, and avoided the problem of the incompatibility between the
independence assumption and the normality of the bba’s by allowing non-normal bba’s and including the normalization
step in the definition of Bel, Pl, and Q . That is, Dempster defined the belief, plausibility, and commonality functions (under
other names) associated with a bba m on 2S as Beln, Pln, and Qn, respectively, where mn is the normalized version of m.
This corresponds to using equivalence classes of bba’s instead of bba’s: an equivalence class contains all bba’s leading to
the same normal bba when normalized. In particular, the independence assumption poses no problem: the combination of
the equivalence classes of bba’s represented by m1, . . . ,mn is the equivalence class of bba’s represented by mI . If we use
the normal bba’s as representatives of the equivalence classes, then the combination of the normal bba’sm1, . . . ,mn is the
normalized version of mI; that is, we obtain Dempster’s rule of combination. However, this mathematical expedient does
not solve the real problem of the impossibility of independence for the normal bba’s (on which Bel, Pl, and Q are based).
Moreover, the approach with equivalence classes of bba’s is not applicable when the independence is not assumed, because
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the normalized possible combinations ofm1, . . . ,mn (that is, the normalized versions ofmJ , for all jba’s J ∈ J (m1, . . . ,mn))
depend on the conflictsm1(∅), . . . ,mn(∅) of the particular representatives of the respective equivalence classes.
Inhismonograph [41], Shaferabandonedtheprobabilistic interpretationof thebeliefmasses, and justifiedDempster’s rule
of combination on intuitive grounds, by interpreting geometrically the independence of the information sources. However,
this geometrical interpretation does not avoid the problem of the incompatibility between the independence assumption
and the normality of the combination. Later [42], Shafer gave a new interpretation of the belief masses, implicitly relying on
fiducial probability, but it is not clear if fiducial inference is applicable for the combinationofm1, . . . ,mnwhen independence
is assumed and mI(∅) > 0 (see for instance [27,37]). Hence, the question of the compatibility between the independence
assumption and the normality of the combination remains open.
Smets [45] followed [41] in the non-probabilistic interpretation of the belief masses, and replaced the independence
assumption by equivalent technical requirements. Like Dempster, Smets avoided the problem of the incompatibility with
the normality of the bba’s by allowing non-normal bba’s, but differently fromDempster, he did not include the normalization
step in the definition of Bel, Pl, and Q . However, all uses of the non-normal bba’s (such as the decisions based on the pignistic
transformation [48]) seem to involve an explicit or implicit normalization, and under the usual closed-world assumption
we recover Dempster’s rule of combination. Hence, as in the approach with equivalence classes of bba’s, the mathematical
expedient of non-normality does not solve the real problem of the impossibility of independence for the normal bba’s (on
which all uses of the model seem to be actually based).
3.2. Approximating independence
In general, the normalization step in Dempster’s rule of combination seems to be justified only as an approximation
step: the result of the combination of m1, . . . ,mn can be interpreted as the best approximation of mI by a normal bba on
2S (this idea is studied also in [31]). That is, in general Dempster’s rule of combination corresponds to an assumption of
approximate independence; in particular, when the conflict mI(∅) is large, the reasonableness of that assumption can be
questionable (because the approximation would be poor), and the result of Dempster’s rule of combination can be rather
arbitrary (compare with [41, p. 254]).
Anyway, the independence assumption is always problematic, because the meaning of the dependence between the
information sources is very abstract (this holds for all interpretations of the belief masses). For the same reason, the as-
sumption of other specific dependence structures for the information sources (as described for example in [35]) is usually
even more problematic. In this paper we study combination rules for the situation in which no assumption is made about
the dependence of the information sources.
4. On combination rules and their properties
Letm1, . . . ,mn be n ≥ 1 normal bba’s on 2S . We study rules for combiningm1, . . . ,mn into a normal bba 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉
on 2S , with 〈m1〉 = m1 when n = 1. Many combination rules have been proposed in the literature: see for instance [40,47]
for partial reviews. However, most of these rules require the independence of the information sources: exceptions are for
example the combination rules proposed in [33,29,20,1,31,35,11,13,21,28,12].
Theabove formulation imposes somestrongconstraintson therulesconsidered. Firstof all, thecombination 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉
can only depend on the bba’sm1, . . . ,mn, while for example the rules studied in [33,35,21,28] require additional informa-
tion about the dependence of the information sources. Secondly, the combination 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉must be defined for all finite,
nonempty sets S, and all normal bba’sm1, . . . ,mn on 2
S , while for instance the rules proposed in [1,25] impose constraints
on S, and the rules studied in [29,20,11] are limited to particular classes of bba’s. Finally, the combination 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉
must be a normal bba on 2S , while for example the rules proposed in [6,12] do not lead in general to a bba, and the rules
studied in [45,13] can lead to a non-normal bba.
It seems that no combination rule satisfying these three constraints without assuming the independence of the infor-
mation sources has ever been published. However, we obtain such a rule if we generalize to all finite, nonempty sets S
the combination rule proposed by Cattaneo [1], if we extend also to dogmatic bba’s the normalized cautious rule studied
by Denœux [11], or if we completely specify (by introducing a second criterion after maximal expected cardinality) and
normalize the combination suggested by Destercke et al. [13].
4.1. Basic requirements
We are considering the combination of n bba’s, without assuming that these are ordered in any particular way. Hence, a
basic requirement for combination rules is commutativity: a rule is commutative if
〈mπ(1), . . . ,mπ(n)〉 = 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉
for all permutations π of {1, . . . , n}. Most combination rules in the literature are binary: the combination of n bba’s is
obtained through n−1 applications of the binary rule. The commutativity of the resulting n-ary combination rule is implied
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by the commutativity and associativity of the binary rule; hence, for binary rules associativity is also fundamental. Many
binary rules proposed in the literature are commutative, but not associative: however, most of them could be extended to
commutative n-ary combination rules. In general, associativity is not so fundamental for n-ary combination rules as it is for
binary ones, but it can have important advantages from the computational point of view.
The simultaneous consideration of different frames of discernment on which the same beliefs are described is a central
feature of Dempster–Shafer theory (see for example [41,43]). In particular, the ability of describing exactly the same infor-
mation also on more refined frames of discernment is a fundamental property of the theory. In fact, ifm is a bba on 2S , and
(R, r) is a refinement of S, then m and its vacuous extension m↑(R,r) describe the same information, while for instance two
probability distributions on R and S, respectively, cannot describe exactly the same information when |R| > |S|. Since a
bba and its vacuous extensions describe the same information, they can be considered as equivalent. The original theory by
Dempster and Shafer respects this equivalence, while surprisinglymanymethods proposed by other authors in the literature
on Dempster–Shafer theory do not respect it. For example, the equivalence between a bba and its vacuous extensions is not
respected by the pignistic transformation [48] or any other transformation of belief functions in probability distributions
(such as those studied in [7,3–5]), by the second component of the measure of conflict proposed by Liu [34], or by the
combination rule suggested by Destercke et al. [13]. In fact, that rule does not satisfy the basic requirement of equivariance
with respect to vacuous extensions: a combination rule is equivariant with respect to vacuous extensions if
〈m↑(R,r)1 , . . . ,m↑(R,r)n 〉 = 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉↑(R,r)
for all refinements (R, r) of S. This basic requirement implies in particular that all focal sets of 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 are elements
of the algebra of subsets of S generated by all focal sets ofm1, . . . ,mn (sincem1, . . . ,mn can be seen as vacuous extensions
to 2S of n bba’s on that algebra of subsets). Hence, besides the above theoretical justification, the equivariance with respect
to vacuous extensions can also have important advantages from the computational point of view. The combination rule
proposed by Cattaneo [1] is equivariant with respect to vacuous extensions in the restricted framework of [1], but in order
to maintain this property when generalizing the rule to all finite, nonempty sets S, the measure of nonspecificity should be
replaced with a more suitable measure of noncommitment.
Another central feature of Dempster–Shafer theory is that it generalizes propositional logic (see for example [9,36,30,1]).
When a normal bbam on 2S describes a piece of information about the uncertain value of x ∈ S, the proposition “x ∈ A” is
certain according to that piece of information if and only if C(m) ⊆ A (that is, if and only if Bel(A) = 1). In propositional
logic, the certainty of a proposition is preserved when new information is acquired. Hence, a combination rule generalizes
propositional logic only if it satisfies the basic requirement of certainty preservation: a rule preserves certainty if
C(〈m1, . . . ,mn〉) ⊆ C(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ C(mn)
when the right-hand side is not empty (that is, when cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) < 1). We could have restricted the definition
of the combination rules to the case with cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) < 1 (that is, the case in which all certainties described by
m1, . . . ,mn are compatible), but it is simpler to require 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 to be defined even when cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 1:
for example as the vacuous bba on 2S (we tacitly assume that this is the case for those rules that are usually not defined
when cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 1, such as Dempster’s rule of combination). Certainty preservation is useful because it allows
Dempster–Shafer theory to handle certain as well as uncertain knowledge, but it is important to underline that the degree of
belief 1 shouldbeassignedonly toabsolutely certainpropositions. Inparticular, anycombination rule thatpreserves certainty
gives the same result as Dempster’s rule of combination in themedical diagnosis example of Zadeh [55]. Even though it is the
only reasonable result in that example (see for instance [43,22,23]), several authors have suggested alternative combination
rules in order to “correct” it (for example in [51,18,32,25,6,26]): of course, none of these rules preserves certainty.
Dempster’s rule of combination satisfies the above three basic requirements (commutativity, equivariancewith respect to
vacuousextensions, andcertaintypreservation), and sodo the combination ruleproposedbyCattaneo [1] and thenormalized
cautious rule studied by Denœux [11], when suitably extended to the present framework. It is interesting to note that these
basic requirements for n-ary combination rules are very similar to the criteria for binary rules considered by Smets [47,
Section A.4]: that is, commutativity and associativity (implying the commutativity of the resulting n-ary combination rules),
equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions (called “resistance to refinement”), a special case of certainty preservation
(called “plausibility of false”), and two criteria strictly related to it (“duplicate conditioning” and “iterated conditioning”).
4.2. Absorption and idempotency
All combination rules that have been proposed for the situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence
of the information sources (such as the rules studied in [29,20,1,11,13,12]) seem to satisfy the property of idempotency: a
rule is idempotent if
m1 = · · · = mn ⇒ 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 = m1.
When the bba’s m1, . . . ,mn on 2
S are equal, they could describe exactly the same piece of information (in which case the
sources would be completely dependent), or the information sources could be independent or have any other
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dependence structure. A combination rule that does not use additional information about the dependence of the sources can-
not distinguish among these cases: the idempotency corresponds to the cautious choice of assuming that the total amount
of information is the minimum possible. In fact, the total amount of information is minimal when m1, . . . ,mn describe
exactly the same piece of information, and in this case 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 = m1 describes the combined information.
The cautious choice of assuming that the total amount of information is the minimum possible leads also to the more
general property of absorption: a combination rule is absorbing if
m1 ∈ S(mn) ⇒ 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 = 〈m1, . . . ,mn−1〉
for all n ≥ 2. In fact, if m1 is a specialization of mn, then m1 could describe the same information as mn plus some addi-
tional information. Hence, when the total amount of information is the minimum possible, the combined information of
m1, . . . ,mn−1 corresponds to the combined information of m1, . . . ,mn. The property of absorption implies by induction
that if m1 is a common specialization of m2, . . . ,mn, then 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 = m1; therefore, in particular, absorption im-
plies idempotency. The property of absorption is satisfied by the combination rules studied in [20,1,13,12], but not by the
idempotent rules proposed in [29,11]. In particular, the following example shows that in the fundamental problem of the
combination of two simple bba’s, the cautious rule suggested by Denœux [11] gives very often the same result as Dempster’s
rule of combination (that is, the result obtained when the two sources of information are assumed to be independent).
Example 3. Let A, B be nonempty, proper subsets of S, and let α, β ∈ (0, 1) satisfy α ≥ β . If A ⊆ B, then the simple bba
mA,α on 2
S is a specialization of the simple bba mB,β on 2
S , and therefore the combination of mA,α,mB,β is mA,α for any
rule satisfying the property of absorption. By contrast, the cautious rule studied by Denœux [11] (which in this situation
corresponds to the conjunctive rule proposed by Kennes [29]) gives the same result as Dempster’s rule of combinationwhen
A 	= B, and gives the resultmA,α only when A = B.
4.3. Dempster’s rule of conditioning and the minimum rule of possibility theory
Dempster’s rule of conditioning is the special case of Dempster’s rule of combination for two normal bba’sm1,m2 on 2
S
when m2 assigns the total belief mass 1 to a nonempty subset of S (that is, m2 is either the vacuous bba on 2
S or a simple
bbamA,1 on 2
S such that A ⊂ S is not empty). In this case, J (m1,m2) is a singleton, because ifm1,m2 are interpreted as the
probability distributions of the random subsets X1, X2 of S, respectively, then X1, X2 are certainly independent (since X2 is
constant a.s.), and therefore there is exactly one jba I with marginalsm1,m2. Hence, when the belief masses are interpreted
probabilistically (as in [8,42]), the result of Dempster’s rule of conditioning can be justified as the best approximation of
mI by a normal bba on 2
S (see Section 3.2), without need of any assumptions about the dependence of the information
sources. When the belief masses are interpreted non-probabilistically (as in [41,45]), Dempster’s rule of conditioning can
be justified by considering specializations, which are a fundamental concept in Dempster–Shafer theory independently of
the interpretation of the belief masses: see for example the expressions (2). As noted in Section 4.2, a specialization of a
bba m can be interpreted as describing the same information as m plus some additional information; hence, it is natural
to assume that the combination of m1, . . . ,mn is a common specialization of m1, . . . ,mn, or an approximation thereof.
In the case of conditioning, Theorem 1 implies S(m1) ∩ S(m2) = S(mI), and therefore mI is the most cautious choice of
a common specialization of m1,m2, in the sense of describing the least possible amount of information. In fact, all other
common specializations ofm1,m2 can be interpreted as describingmore information thanmI , since they are specializations
ofmI as well. Hence, the result of Dempster’s rule of conditioning can be justified also as the best normal approximation of
the least specialized common specialization ofm1,m2 (see also [47, Theorem 3.2]).
A combination rule generalizes Dempster’s rule of conditioning if it gives the same result as Dempster’s rule of combination
in the caseof conditioning (that is, in the caseof combining twonormalbba’sm1,m2 on2
S such thatm2 assigns the total belief
mass 1 to a nonempty subset of S). In particular, Dempster’s rule of conditioning is generalized (at least up to normalization)
by the combination rules proposed in [29,20,1,13,12] for the situation inwhichnoassumption ismadeabout thedependence
of the information sources. By contrast, the cautious rule suggested by Denœux [11] does not generalize Dempster’s rule of
conditioning: the result of the combination of a non-separable bba m on 2S with the vacuous bba on 2S is not m (see [11,
Propositions 8 and 9]), in contrast with the usual interpretation of the vacuous bba as the bba describing no information.
Non-separable bba’s pose difficulties also with the interpretation of Denœux’s cautious rule (since the interpretation of
negative weights of evidence is rather difficult, see also [21, Section 2.3]), and when restricted to separable bba’s, Denœux’s
cautious rule reduces to the conjunctive rule already studied by Kennes [29] (who notes that it was suggested by Smets).
The plausibility functions associated with the consonant bba’s on 2S correspond to the possibility measures on 2S ,
considered in possibility theory [54,17]. The usual (and most cautious) conjunctive combination rule in possibility theory
is the minimum rule, which corresponds to combining the consonant bba’s m1, . . . ,mn on 2
S into the consonant bba
on 2S associated with the contour function π1 ∧ · · · ∧ πn (or into its normalized version), where π1, . . . , πn are the
contour functions associated with m1, . . . ,mn, respectively, and ∧ is the pointwise minimum operator. It can be easily
proved (by explicit construction, see for example [15,19]) that there is a jba J∈J (m1, . . . ,mn) such thatmJ is the result of
theunnormalized version of theminimumrule of possibility theory (that is,mJ is the consonant bba on2
S associatedwith the
contour functionπ1∧· · ·∧πn). Hence, Theorem1 implies thatmJ is a common specialization ofm1, . . . ,mn, and Theorem5
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implies that QJ is the pointwise maximum of the commonality functions associated with the common specializations of
m1, . . . ,mn, since
QJ(A) = min
x∈A (π1 ∧ · · · ∧ πn)(x) = mini∈{1,...,n}Qi(A) = (Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn)(A) (5)
for all nonempty A ⊆ S. Therefore, the result of the unnormalized version of theminimum rule of possibility theory is a least
specialized common specialization ofm1, . . . ,mn (in the sense that it is not a specialization of another common specializa-
tion of m1, . . . ,mn), but the following simple example shows that in general the least specialized common specialization
ofm1, . . . ,mn is not unique (hence, Theorem 4 of [20] is wrong).
Example 4. Let A, B be nonempty, disjoint subsets of S, and for each α ∈ [0, 1
2
] let mα be the bba on 2S defined by
mα(A) = mα(B) = α and mα(S) = mα(∅) = 12 − α. It can be easily checked that the bba’s mα are the ones induced by
the jba’s with as marginals the simple bba’smA,1/2,mB,1/2 on 2
S , and that
(
PlA,1/2 ∧ PlB,1/2) (C) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if C = ∅,
1 if C ∩ A 	= ∅ and C ∩ B 	= ∅,
1
2
otherwise,
and
(
QA,1/2 ∧ QB,1/2) (C) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if C = ∅,
1
2
otherwise.
Hence, QA,1/2 ∧ QB,1/2 = Q0; moreover, PlA,1/2 uprise PlB,1/2 = PlA,1/2 ∧ PlB,1/2, since PlA,1/2(C) ≥ 12 and PlB,1/2(C) ≥ 12 for all
nonempty C ⊂ S. Therefore, PlA,1/2 uprise PlB,1/2 = Pl1/2 when A ∪ B = S, while PlA,1/2 uprise PlB,1/2 is not a plausibility function on
2S when A ∪ B ⊂ S, because for instance
(
PlA,1/2 uprise PlB,1/2
)
(A)+ (PlA,1/2 uprise PlB,1/2) (B) = 12 + 12 < 1+ 12 =
(
PlA,1/2 uprise PlB,1/2
)
(A∪ B)+ (PlA,1/2 uprise PlB,1/2) (A∩ B),
whereas plausibility functions are 2-alternating.
Hence, theminimumrule of possibility theory combinesmA,1/2,mB,1/2 intom0 (or into its normalized version: the vacuous
bba on 2S), but Theorem 1 implies that each bba mα is a least specialized common specialization of mA,1/2,mB,1/2, since
mα is not a specialization of mα′ when α′ 	= α. That is, m0 is not the unique least specialized common specialization
of mA,1/2,mB,1/2, but it is the only one pointwise maximizing the associated commonality function. For instance, m1/2 is
another least specialized common specialization ofmA,1/2,mB,1/2, and it is the only one pointwisemaximizing the associated
plausibility function when A ∪ B = S, as follows from Theorem 4. By contrast, when A ∪ B ⊂ S, Theorem 1 implies that
each bba mα is a common specialization of mA,1/2,mB,1/2 pointwise maximizing the associated plausibility function (in the
sense that Plα is not pointwise dominated by any plausibility function associated with another common specialization of
mA,1/2,mB,1/2), since Plα is not dominated by Plα′ when α′ 	= α.
As noted above, it is natural to assume that the combination ofm1, . . . ,mn is a common specialization ofm1, . . . ,mn (or
an approximation thereof), and when the least specialized common specialization of m1, . . . ,mn is not unique, the usual
ways of choosing a most cautious common specialization ofm1, . . . ,mn are by pointwise maximizing the associated plau-
sibility or commonality functions (see for example [14,50,16,24,46,20]). Whenm1, . . . ,mn are consonant, the result of the
unnormalized version of the minimum rule of possibility theory is the unique common specialization ofm1, . . . ,mn point-
wise maximizing the associated commonality function, while Example 4 shows that in general the common specialization
of m1, . . . ,mn pointwise maximizing the associated plausibility function is not unique. A combination rule generalizes the
minimum rule of possibility theory if it gives the same result as the normalized version of that rule whenm1, . . . ,mn are con-
sonant. In particular, the minimum rule of possibility theory is generalized (up to normalization) by the combination rules
studied in [13,12] (if we completely specify them in a suitableway). By contrast, the combination rules proposed in [29,1,11]
do not generalize the minimum rule of possibility theory: when applied to the situation of Example 4, the rules studied by
Kennes [29] and Denœux [11] give the same result (at least up to normalization) as Dempster’s rule of combination, while
the rule proposed by Cattaneo [1] gives the resultm1/2.
4.4. Quasi-associativity
Aproperty that can have important advantages from the computational point of view is quasi-associativity: a combination
rule is quasi-associative if there are an associative binary operator . on a set F , a function f assigning to each normal bba
on 2S an element of F , and a function g on F such that
〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 = g(f (m1). · · ·.f (mn)).
This definition basically corresponds to the idea of Yager [52]; it implies in particular (g ◦ f )(m) = 〈m〉 = m for all normal
bba’s m on 2S (hence, f is an injection, and g is a quasi-inverse of f ). The computational advantages of quasi-associativity
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are related to the possibility of performing the actual combinations in the set F by means of the associative binary operator
.: the application of the function g can be interpreted as an approximation step, in the sense that f (〈m1, . . . ,mn〉) can
be interpreted as the best approximation of f (m1). · · ·.f (mn) by an element of the image of f . An n-ary combination
rule obtained through n − 1 applications of an associative binary rule is trivially quasi-associative (with f = g the identity
function and . the binary rule); another example of quasi-associative combination rule is the one proposed by Daniel [6],
where the elements of F are generalized belief functions. Since the normalized version of the minimum rule of possibility
theory is not associative, a combination rule generalizing the minimum rule of possibility theory cannot be associative, but
it can be quasi-associative, as will be shown in the following section.
5. Two combination rules not requiring assumptions about the dependence of the information sources
Letm1, . . . ,mn be n≥1 normal bba’s on 2S , describing the information obtained from different sources, and consider the
situation in which no assumption is made about the dependence of the information sources. When the belief masses are
interpreted probabilistically (as in [8,42]), the combined information is described by a bba induced by some jba with mar-
ginalsm1, . . . ,mn, while as noted in Section 4.3, when the beliefmasses are interpreted non-probabilistically (as in [41,45]),
it is natural to assume that the combined information is described by a common specialization of m1, . . . ,mn. Hence, we
have a set
{
mJ : J∈J (m1, . . . ,mn)} or S(m1)∩ · · · ∩S(mn) of bba’s on 2S possibly describing the combined information,
and the usual way to proceed corresponds to the cautious choice of excluding the elements describing more information
than is strictly necessary (see for example [16,24,46,20]). The resulting subsets depend on the exact definition of informa-
tion content of a bba, but the usual definitions are compatible with the concept of specialization, in the sense that a more
specialized bba is also more informative (see for instance [14,50,16,24,46,20]). Therefore, we can restrict attention to the
two subsets of all least specialized elements of
{
mJ : J∈J (m1, . . . ,mn)} and S(m1)∩ · · · ∩S(mn), respectively: Theorem 1
implies that these two subsets are equal; that is, we have a subset of least specialized bba’s on 2S possibly describing the
combined information, independently of the interpretation of the belief masses.
If there is a unique least specialized common specialization ms of m1, . . . ,mn, then maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ and
maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ are the plausibility and commonality functions associated with ms, respectively, and we can con-
sider the normalized version m of ms as a cautious combination of m1, . . . ,mn: it can be interpreted as the best ap-
proximation of ms by a normal bba on 2
S (see Section 3.2), or equivalently Pl and Q can be interpreted as the best
approximations of maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ and maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ by a plausibility and a commonality functions associated
with some normal bba’s on 2S , respectively.
As noted in Section 4.3, when the least specialized common specialization ofm1, . . . ,mn is not unique, the usual ways of
choosing a most cautious common specialization ofm1, . . . ,mn are by pointwise maximizing the associated plausibility or
commonality functions. If there is a unique common specializationms ofm1, . . . ,mn pointwise maximizing the associated
plausibility function, then maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ is the plausibility function associated with ms, and we can consider the
normalized version m of ms as a cautious combination of m1, . . . ,mn: it can be interpreted as the best approximation
of ms by a normal bba on 2
S , or equivalently Pl can be interpreted as the best approximation of maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ by a
plausibility function associated with some normal bba on 2S . Analogously, if there is a unique common specialization ms
of m1, . . . ,mn pointwise maximizing the associated commonality function, then maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ is the commonality
function associated withms, and we can consider the normalized versionm ofms as a cautious combination ofm1, . . . ,mn:
it can be interpreted as the best approximation of ms by a normal bba on 2
S , or equivalently Q can be interpreted as the
best approximation of maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ by a commonality function associated with some normal bba on 2S . However,
Example 4 and Theorem 4 imply that in general maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ is not a plausibility function on 2S , while the following
example and Theorem 5 imply that in general maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ is not a commonality function on 2S .
Example 5. In the situation of Example 1,
(Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn) (A) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if A = ∅,
1
2
if |A| = 1,
0 otherwise.
Therefore, Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn is not a commonality function on 2S , because for instance
∑
A⊆S
(−1)|A| (Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn)(A) = 1 − n2 ≤ − 12 < 0,
whereas all commonality functions Q on 2S satisfy
∑
A⊆S(−1)|A| Q(A) ≥ 0.
Hence, pointwise maximizing the associated plausibility or commonality functions does not always lead to a unique
common specialization of m1, . . . ,mn. To avoid this problem, we could consider a measure of information content that
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always allows to choose a unique least informative bba from a set of bba’s on 2S: if this measure is compatible with the
concept of specialization (in the sense that amore specialized bba is alsomore informative), then Theorem1 implies that the
least informativebba in
{
mJ : J ∈ J (m1, . . . ,mn)} corresponds to the least informativebba inS(m1)∩· · ·∩S(mn), and it can
be easily proved that the combination rule obtained by considering the normalized version of that least informative bba as
the combination ofm1, . . . ,mn would satisfy the properties of commutativity, quasi-associativity, idempotency, absorption,
and certainty preservation, andwould generalize Dempster’s rule of conditioning. This is the approach followed for instance
by Destercke et al. [13], but their measure of information (based on expected cardinality) does not always allow to choose a
unique least informative common specialization ofm1, . . . ,mn, and thus their combination rule is not completely specified
(in another paper [12], Destercke and Dubois consider sets of least informative bba’s as possible results of combinations).
In general, this approach has difficulties with the basic requirement of equivariance with respect to vacuous extensions (for
example, the rule studied by Destercke et al. [13] does not satisfy that requirement), and the minimization of the measure
of information can be computationally too demanding for many applications of the combination rule.
The idea of the present section is to consider as cautious combination ofm1, . . . ,mn a normal bbam on 2
S such that Pl can
be interpreted as the best approximation of maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ by a plausibility function associated with some normal bba
on2S , evenwhenmaxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ is not a plausibility functionon2S; or alternatively, to consider as cautious combination
of m1, . . . ,mn a normal bba m on 2
S such that Q can be interpreted as the best approximation of maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ by
a commonality function associated with some normal bba on 2S , even when maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ is not a commonality
function on 2S . Hence, we need an approximationmethodmore general than normalization: ideally, we could choose Pl and
Q by minimizing some suitable measures of distance from maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ and maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ , respectively, but
the study of such distance measures and of algorithms for minimizing them goes beyond the scope of the present paper. In
the following two subsections, we shall present results that hold for whole classes of approximation methods, and we shall
only give two simple examples of approximation methods belonging to these classes.
5.1. TheuprisePl-rule
We first consider the combination rule obtained by defining 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 as the normal bba on 2S associated with
the plausibility function best approximating maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ . The exact calculation of maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) PlJ would be
computationally too demanding for many applications of the rule, but the simple upper approximation Pl1 uprise · · · uprise Pln
suggested by Theorem 4 is exact when n ≤ 2, and often exact when n ≥ 3. Hence, we consider the combination rule
obtained by defining 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 as the normal bba on 2S associated with the plausibility function best approximating
Pl1 uprise · · · uprise Pln. Actually, the approximation by a plausibility function can be unnecessary in many applications, since the
monotonic, subadditive function Pl1 uprise · · · uprise Pln on 2S can be used directly to make inferences and decisions: for instance
by simply comparing the values assigned by Pl1 uprise · · · uprise Pln to competing subsets of S, or more generally by comparing
the nonadditive integrals (with respect to Pl1 uprise · · · uprise Pln) of the utility or loss functions on S associated with competing
decisions (see for example [10,2]).
Theorem 7. Let ξ be a function assigning to eachμ ∈ MS0(S) a normal bba on 2S, and satisfying the following three conditions:
• if m is a bba on 2S such that m(∅) < 1, then ξ(Pl) is the normalized version of m;
• ξ(μ ◦ r˜) = (ξ(μ))↑(R,r) for all μ ∈ MS0(S) and all refinements (R, r) of S;• C(ξ(μ)) ⊆ {x ∈ S : μ({x}) > 0} when the right-hand side is not empty, for all μ ∈ MS0(S).
Then the combination rule defined by
〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 = ξ(Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln)
satisfies the properties of commutativity, quasi-associativity, idempotency, absorption, equivariance with respect to vacuous ex-
tensions, and certainty preservation, and generalizes Dempster’s rule of conditioning.
WecalluprisePl-ruleanycombination ruleof the formconsidered inTheorem7, independentlyof theparticular approximation
method ξ . A simple exampleof approximationmethod satisfying the conditionsof Theorem7 is the following: for eachA ⊆ S,
in order of increasing cardinality, define
m(A) = max
{
0, 1 − μ(A) −∑B⊂Am(B)
}
,
and if
∑
B⊆S: B 	=∅ m(B) > 0, then define (ξ(μ)) (∅) = 0 and
(ξ(μ)) (A) = m(A)∑
B⊆S: B 	=∅ m(B)
(6)
for all nonempty A ⊆ S, while if∑B⊆S: B 	=∅ m(B) = 0, then define ξ(μ) as the vacuous bba on 2S .
When μ is a plausibility function on 2S , the bba m associated with μ can be obtained by calculating m(A) = 1 −
μ(A) − ∑B⊂Am(B) for each A ⊆ S, in order of increasing cardinality. Hence, the approximation method (6) satisfies the
first condition of Theorem 7, and can be interpreted as simply enforcing the nonnegativity and normality ofm also whenμ
310 M. Cattaneo / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 299–315
is not a plausibility function. It can be easily proved that the approximation method (6) satisfies also the second and third
conditions of Theorem 7, and that
∑
B⊆S: B 	=∅ m(B) = 0 in the algorithm (6) if and only if cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 1.
Example 6. In the situation of Example 1, Pl1 uprise · · · uprise Pln = Pl1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pln, since Pli(A) ≥ 12 for all nonempty A ⊂ S and
all i ∈ S. Hence, Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln is not 2-alternating, because for instance (see Example 2)
(Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln) ({1, 2}) + (Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln) ({2, . . . , n}) = 12 + 12 <
< 1 + 1
2
= (Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln) ({1, 2} ∪ {2, . . . , n}) + (Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln) ({1, 2} ∩ {2, . . . , n}).
Therefore, Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln is not a plausibility function on 2S , and the result of theuprisePl-rule depends on the approximation
method. In the algorithm (6) we obtain m(∅) = 0, m({i}) = 1
2
for all i ∈ S, and m(A) = 0 for all A ⊆ S such that |A| ≥ 2.
Hence, the result of theuprisePl-rule with the approximation method (6) is the bbam′ on 2S such thatm′({i}) = 1
n
for all i ∈ S.
In the situation of Example 3, the result of theuprisePl-rule is mA,α , independently of the approximation method, since the
uprisePl-rule satisfies the property of absorption.
In the situation of Example 4, if A∪B = S, then PlA,1/2uprisePlB,1/2 = Pl1/2, and the result of theuprisePl-rule ism1/2, independently
of the approximation method; while if A ∪ B ⊂ S, then PlA,1/2 uprise PlB,1/2 is not a plausibility function on 2S , and the result
of theuprisePl-rule depends on the approximation method: with the method (6) the result is m1/2 in this case too, since in the
algorithm (6) we obtainm = m1/2.
5.2. The ∧Q-rule
We now consider the combination rule obtained by defining 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 as the normal bba on 2S associated with the
commonality function best approximating maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ . An advantage over theuprisePl-rule is that maxJ∈J (m1,...,mn) QJ
can be easily calculated as Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn thanks to Theorem 5, while a drawback is that the interpretation of commonality
functions is less straightforward than the interpretation of plausibility functions, and in particular the approximation of
Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn by a commonality function seems to be necessary in most applications (since usually the anti-monotonic,
quasi-superadditive functionQ1∧· · ·∧Qn on2S cannot beuseddirectly tomake inferences anddecisions). The expression (1)
implies that this rule is strictly connectedwithDempster’s rule of combination,whose result canbe interpreted as thenormal
bba on 2S associated with the commonality function best approximating Q1 · · ·Qn; and the expression (5) shows that the
present rule can also be interpreted as a straightforward generalization of theminimum rule of possibility theory. Moreover,
there is an interesting similarity with the normalized cautious rule studied by Denœux [11], where weight functions are
used instead of commonality functions: an advantage of Denœux’s cautious rule is that no approximation method more
general than normalization is necessary, while drawbacks are the problems with non-separable bba’s (see Section 4.3) and
the strange behavior outlined in Example 3.
Theorem 8. Let χ be a function assigning to each ν ∈ AQ1(S) a normal bba on 2S, and satisfying the following three conditions:
• if m is a bba on 2S such that m(∅) < 1, then χ(Q) is the normalized version of m;
• χ(ν ◦ r˜) = (χ(ν))↑(R,r) for all ν ∈ AQ1(S) and all refinements (R, r) of S;• C(χ(ν)) ⊆ {x ∈ S : ν({x}) > 0} when the right-hand side is not empty, for all ν ∈ AQ1(S).
Then the combination rule defined by
〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 = χ(Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn)
satisfies the properties of commutativity, quasi-associativity, idempotency, absorption, equivariance with respect to vacuous ex-
tensions, and certainty preservation, and generalizes Dempster’s rule of conditioning and the minimum rule of possibility theory.
Wecall∧Q-ruleanycombination ruleof the formconsidered inTheorem8, independentlyof theparticular approximation
method χ . A simple example of approximation method satisfying the conditions of Theorem 8 is the following: for each
A ⊆ S, in order of decreasing cardinality, define
m(A) = max
{
0, ν(A) −∑B⊆S: A⊂Bm(B)
}
,
and if
∑
B⊆S: B 	=∅ m(B) > 0, then define (χ(ν)) (∅) = 0 and
(χ(ν)) (A) = m(A)∑
B⊆S: B 	=∅ m(B)
(7)
for all nonempty A ⊆ S, while if∑B⊆S: B 	=∅ m(B) = 0, then define χ(ν) as the vacuous bba on 2S .
When ν is a commonality function on 2S , the bba m associated with ν can be obtained by calculating m(A) = ν(A) −∑
B⊆S: A⊂Bm(B) for each A ⊆ S, in order of decreasing cardinality. Hence, the approximation method (7) satisfies the first
condition of Theorem 8, and can be interpreted as simply enforcing the nonnegativity and normality of m also when ν is
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not a commonality function. It can be easily proved that the approximation method (7) satisfies also the second and third
conditions of Theorem 8, and that
∑
B⊆S: B 	=∅ m(B) = 0 in the algorithm (7) if and only if cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 1.
Example 7. In the situation of Example 1, Q1 ∧ · · ·∧Qn is not a commonality function on 2S (see Example 5), and the result
of the ∧Q-rule depends on the approximation method. In the algorithm (7) we obtain m(A) = 0 for all A ⊆ S such that
|A| ≥ 2,m({i}) = 1
2
for all i ∈ S, andm(∅) = 0. Hence, the result of the∧Q-rule with the approximation method (7) is the
bbam′ on 2S such thatm′({i}) = 1
n
for all i ∈ S.
In the situation of Example 3, the result of the ∧Q-rule is mA,α , independently of the approximation method, since the∧Q-rule satisfies the property of absorption.
In the situation of Example 4, the result of the ∧Q-rule is the vacuous bba on 2S , independently of the approximation
method, since the ∧Q-rule generalizes the minimum rule of possibility theory.
6. Conclusion
In the present paper the problem of combining belief functions obtained from not necessarily independent sources of
information has been studied. The minimal conflict of belief functions has been defined: it is a much better measure of
disagreement among belief functions than the conflict of Dempster’s rule of combination, which assumes the independence
of the information sources.
Two combination rules for the situation inwhichno assumption ismade about thedependence of the information sources
have been proposed: theuprisePl-rule and the∧Q-rule. They consist in approximating by a plausibility and a commonality func-
tions the combinations Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln and Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn of the plausibility and commonality functions obtained from the
information sources, respectively, where uprise and ∧ are two simple commutative and associative binary operators. The pro-
posed combination rules satisfy the properties of commutativity, quasi-associativity, idempotency, absorption, equivariance
with respect to vacuous extensions, and certainty preservation, and generalize Dempster’s rule of conditioning. Moreover,
the ∧Q-rule generalizes the minimum rule of possibility theory, and is closely connected with both Dempster’s rule of
combination and the cautious rule studied by Denœux [11], but the uprisePl-rule has the advantage that the interpretation of
plausibility functions is more straightforward than the interpretation of commonality functions.
As regards the approximations of Pl1 uprise · · · uprise Pln and Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn by a plausibility and a commonality functions,
respectively, in the present paper only two simple algorithms have been proposed. Better algorithms would improve the
uprisePl-rule and the ∧Q-rule: in particular, it would be interesting to have upper approximations of Pl1 uprise · · · uprise Pln and
Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn by a plausibility and a commonality functions, respectively, such that the conditions of Theorems 7 and 8 are
satisfied.
A. Proofs of theorems
Proof of Theorem 1. Ifm ∈ S(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ S(mn), then there are Ji ∈ J (m,mi) such that Ji(B, Bi) > 0 implies B ⊆ Bi, for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and all B, Bi ⊆ S. Let J be the function on (2S)n defined by
J(B1, . . . , Bn) =
∑
B⊆S:
m(B)>0
J1(B, B1) · · · Jn(B, Bn)
m(B)n−1
for all B1, . . . , Bn ⊆ S. Then J ∈ J (m1, . . . ,mn), since J : (2S)n → [0,∞) and, for all A ⊆ S and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S:
Bi=A
J(B1, . . . , Bn) =
∑
B⊆S:
m(B)>0
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S:
Bi=A
J1(B, B1) · · · Jn(B, Bn)
m(B)n−1
= ∑
B⊆S:
m(B)>0
Ji(B, A)m(B)
n−1
m(B)n−1
= mi(A).
Let J′ be the function on (2S)2 defined by
J′(B, A) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 ifm(B) = 0,
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S: B1∩···∩Bn=A
J1(B,B1)···Jn(B,Bn)
m(B)n−1 ifm(B) > 0,
for all B, A ⊆ S. Ifm(B) = 0, then∑A⊆S J′(B, A) = 0 = m(B), and ifm(B) > 0 then
∑
A⊆S
J′(B, A) = ∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S
J1(B, B1) · · · Jn(B, Bn)
m(B)n−1
= m(B)
n
m(B)n−1
= m(B),
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for all B ⊆ S. Hence, J′ ∈ J (m,mJ), because J′ : (2S)2 → [0,∞) and, for all A ⊆ S,
∑
B⊆S
J′(B, A) = ∑
B⊆S:
m(B)>0
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S:
B1∩···∩Bn=A
J1(B, B1) · · · Jn(B, Bn)
m(B)n−1
= ∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S:
B1∩···∩Bn=A
J(B1, . . . , Bn) = mJ(A).
To prove that m ∈ S(mJ), it suffices to show that J′(B, A) > 0 implies B ⊆ A, for all B, A ⊆ S. If J′(B, A) > 0, then
there are B1, . . . , Bn ⊆ S such that B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn = A and Ji(B, Bi) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Therefore, B ⊆ Bi for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and so B ⊆ B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn = A.
We have proved that S(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ S(mn) ⊆ ⋃J∈J (m1,...,mn) S(mJ), and we now turn to the proof of the converse
inclusion. If J ∈ J (m1, . . . ,mn) and m ∈ S(mJ), then there is J′ ∈ J (m,mJ) such that J′(B, BJ) > 0 implies B ⊆ BJ , for all
B, BJ ⊆ S. Let J1, . . . , Jn be the functions on (2S)2 defined by
Ji(B, A) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 ifm(B) = 0,
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S: Bi=A,mJ(B1∩···∩Bn)>0
J′(B,B1∩···∩Bn) J(B1,...,Bn)
mJ(B1∩···∩Bn) ifm(B) > 0,
for all B, A ⊆ S and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Ifm(B) = 0, then∑A⊆S Ji(B, A) = 0 = m(B), and ifm(B) > 0 then
∑
A⊆S
Ji(B, A) =
∑
C⊆S:
mJ(C)>0
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S:
B1∩···∩Bn=C
J′(B, C) J(B1, . . . , Bn)
mJ(C)
= ∑
C⊆S:
mJ(C)>0
J′(B, C) = m(B),
for all B ⊆ S and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence, Ji ∈ J (m,mi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, because Ji : (2S)2 → [0,∞) and, for all
A ⊆ S and all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
∑
B⊆S
Ji(B, A) =
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S:
Bi=A,
mJ(B1∩···∩Bn)>0
∑
B⊆S
J′(B, B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn) J(B1, . . . , Bn)
mJ(B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn) =
∑
B1,...,Bn⊆S:
Bi=A,
mJ(B1∩···∩Bn)>0
J(B1, . . . , Bn) = mi(A).
To prove that m ∈ S(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ S(mn), it suffices to show that Ji(B, A) > 0 implies B ⊆ A, for all B, A ⊆ S and all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. If Ji(B, A) > 0, then there are B1, . . . , Bn ⊆ S such that Bi = A and J′(B, B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn) > 0, and thus
B ⊆ B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn ⊆ A. 
Proof of Theorem 2. To prove thatuprise is a commutative and associative binary operator onMS0(S), it suffices to show that
μ, ν ∈ MS0(S) impliesμupriseν ∈ MS0(S). Sinceμ(∅) = ν(∅) = 0, we have (μupriseν)(∅) = 0 and 0 ≤ μupriseν ≤ μ∧ν ≤ 1.
If A ⊆ B ⊆ S, then
(μuprise ν)(B) = min
C⊆B (μ(C) + ν(B \ C)) ≥ minC⊆B (μ(A ∩ C) + ν(A \ C)) = (μuprise ν)(A),
because μ and ν are monotonic; hence, μuprise ν is monotonic as well. If A, B ⊆ S are disjoint, then
(μuprise ν)(A) + (μuprise ν)(B) = min
C⊆A,D⊆B (μ(C) + ν(A \ C) + μ(D) + ν(B \ D)) ≥
≥ min
C⊆A,D⊆B (μ(C ∪ D) + ν ((A ∪ B) \ (C ∪ D))) = (μuprise ν)(A ∪ B),
because μ and ν are subadditive; hence, μuprise ν is subadditive as well. That is, μ, ν ∈ MS0(S) implies μuprise ν ∈ MS0(S).
Let (R, r) be a refinement of S, and for each A ⊆ R let fA be the function on 2A defined by fA(∅) = ∅ and fA(B) =⋃
x∈r˜(B) (r(x) ∩ A) for all nonempty B ⊆ A. Hence, r˜(fA(B)) = r˜(B) and r˜(A \ fA(B)) = r˜(A) \ r˜(fA(B)) ⊆ r˜(A \ B), for all
B ⊆ A ⊆ R. Therefore, the image of r˜ ◦ fA is 2r˜(A), and since ν is monotonic,
((μ ◦ r˜)uprise (ν ◦ r˜)) (A) = min
B⊆A (μ(r˜(B)) + ν(r˜(A \ B))) = minB⊆A (μ(r˜(fA(B))) + ν(r˜(A) \ r˜(fA(B)))) = (μupriseν)(r˜(A)),
for all A ⊆ R. That is, (μ ◦ r˜)uprise (ν ◦ r˜) = (μuprise ν) ◦ r˜.
If μ ≤ ν and A ⊆ S, then
(μuprise ν)(A) ≤ (μ ∧ ν)(A) = μ(A) = min
B⊆A (μ(B) + μ(A \ B)) ≤ minB⊆A (μ(B) + ν(A \ B)) = (μuprise ν)(A),
because μ is subadditive and μ(∅) = ν(∅) = 0. That is, μ ≤ ν implies μuprise ν = μ. 
M. Cattaneo / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 52 (2011) 299–315 313
Proof of Theorem 3. To prove that ∧ is a commutative and associative binary operator on AQ1(S), it suffices to show that
μ, ν ∈ AQ1(S) impliesμ∧ν ∈ AQ1(S). Clearly, 0 ≤ μ∧ν ≤ 1, and sinceμ(∅) = ν(∅) = 1, we have (μ∧ν)(∅) = 1. If
A ⊆ B ⊆ S, then (μ∧ ν)(A) = min {μ(A), ν(A)} ≥ min {μ(B), ν(B)} = (μ∧ ν)(B), becauseμ and ν are anti-monotonic;
hence, μ ∧ ν is anti-monotonic as well. If A, B ⊆ S are disjoint, then
(μ ∧ ν)(A ∪ B) = min {μ(A ∪ B), ν(A ∪ B)} ≥ min {μ(A) + μ(B) − 1, ν(A) + ν(B) − 1} ≥
≥ min {μ(A), ν(A)} + min {μ(B), ν(B)} − 1 = (μ ∧ ν)(A) + (μ ∧ ν)(B) − 1,
because μ and ν are quasi-superadditive; hence, μ ∧ ν is quasi-superadditive as well. That is, μ, ν ∈ AQ1(S) implies
μ ∧ ν ∈ AQ1(S).
If (R, r) is a refinement of S, and A ⊆ R, then ((μ ◦ r˜) ∧ (ν ◦ r˜)) (A) = min {μ(r˜(A)), ν(r˜(A))} = (μ∧ ν)(r˜(A)); hence,
(μ ◦ r˜) ∧ (ν ◦ r˜) = (μ ∧ ν) ◦ r˜. Moreover, if μ ≤ ν , then μ ∧ ν = μ, because ∧ is the pointwise minimum operator. 
ProofofTheorem4. Theuseofmax insteadof sup in thefirst of the twoFréchetbounds (3) is correct, becausea J′maximizing
J → PlJ(A) overJ (m1, . . . ,mn) certainly exists, since PlJ(A) = ∑B1,...,Bn⊆S: A∩B1∩···∩Bn 	=∅ J(B1, . . . , Bn), and thus the prob-
lem ofmaximizing J → PlJ(A) over J (m1, . . . ,mn) can be interpreted as a problem of linear optimization over a nonempty,
convex polytope in the 2n |S|-dimensional Euclidean space. Hence, mJ′ maximizes m → Pl(A) over ⋃J∈J (m1,...,mn) S(mJ),
because Pl(A) ≤ PlJ(A)whenm ∈ S(mJ). The equality of the two maxima in the first part of the theorem thus follows from
Theorem 1.
The inequality in the first part of the theorem can be easily proved, since for allms ∈ S(m1)∩ · · · ∩ S(mn) and all A ⊆ S,
Pls(A) ≤ min
(B1,...,Bn)∈OPn(A)
(Pls(B1) + · · · + Pls(Bn)) ≤ min
(B1,...,Bn)∈OPn(A)
(Pl1(B1) + · · · + Pln(Bn)) ,
where the first inequality follows by induction from the subadditivity of Pls, while the second one is a consequence of ms
being a specialization ofmi, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We now turn to the proof of the second part of the theorem. The case with n = 1 is obvious. In the case with n = 2, let A
be a subset of S, defineA = {(A1, A2) ∈ (2S)2 : A1∩A2∩A 	= ∅}, and for each C ⊆ S defineBC = {B ⊆ S : B∩A∩C 	= ∅}.
Theorem 4 of [39] implies
max
J∈J (m1,m2)
PlJ(A) = min
A1,A2⊆2S :
A⊆(A1×2S)∪(2S×A2)
⎛
⎝ ∑
A1∈A1
m1(A1) +
∑
A2∈A2
m2(A2)
⎞
⎠ . (A.1)
Let A1,A2 be subsets of 2S such that A ⊆ (A1 × 2S) ∪ (2S × A2), and define C = ∪A2∈2S\A2A2. Then BC ⊆ A1, because
B ∈ BC implies that there is an A2 ∈ 2S \A2 such that B∩ A∩ A2 	= ∅, and thus B ∈ A1 (since (B, A2) ∈ A and A2 /∈ A2). If
A2 ∈ 2S \A2, then A2 ⊆ C and so A2 /∈ BC ; that is, BC ⊆ A2. Moreover,A ⊆ (BC ×2S)∪ (2S ×BC), because A1∩A2∩A 	= ∅
implies A1 ∩ A2 ∩ A ∩ C 	= ∅ or A1 ∩ A2 ∩ A ∩ C 	= ∅. Hence, in the right-hand side of the expression (A.1) it suffices to
minimize over pairs (A1,A2) of the form (BC, BC); that is,
max
J∈J (m1,m2)
PlJ(A) ≥ min
C⊆S
⎛
⎝ ∑
A1∈BC
m1(A1) +
∑
A2∈BC
m2(A2)
⎞
⎠ = min
C⊆S
(
Pl1(A ∩ C) + Pl2(A ∩ C)
)
= (Pl1 uprise Pl2)(A).
This result and the first part of the theorem imply the second part. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Theorem 6 of [38] implies that the use of max instead of sup in the second of the two Fréchet bounds
(3) is correct, and
max
J∈J (m1,...,mn)
QJ(A) = min {Q1(A), . . . ,Qn(A)} = (Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn)(A).
Hence, in particular, there is a J′ maximizing J → QJ(A) over J (m1, . . . ,mn), and thereforemJ′ maximizesm → Q(A) over⋃
J∈J (m1,...,mn) S(mJ), because Q(A) ≤ QJ(A) when m ∈ S(mJ). The equality of the two maxima in the statement of the
theorem thus follows from Theorem 1. 
Proof of Theorem 6. cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 0 if and only if there is anms ∈ S(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ S(mn) withms(∅) = 0; that is,
if and only ifm1, . . . ,mn have a common normal specialization. If C(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ C(mn) = ∅, then cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = 1,
becausems ∈ S(m1)∩· · ·∩S(mn) impliesC(ms) ⊆ C(m1)∩· · ·∩C(mn). On theotherhand, ifC(m1)∩· · ·∩C(mn) 	= ∅, then
there are A1, . . . , An ⊆ S such that A1 ∩ · · · ∩ An 	= ∅ andmi(Ai) > 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; hence, cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) < 1,
because thebbams on2
S definedbyms(A1∩· · ·∩An) = 1−ms(∅) = min{m1(A1), . . . ,mn(An)} is a commonspecialization
ofm1, . . . ,mn.
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Let (R, r) be a refinement of S, and let f : J (m1, . . . ,mn) → J (m↑(R,r)1 , . . . ,m↑(R,r)n ) be defined by
(f (J))(B1, . . . , Bn) =
⎧⎨
⎩
J(r˜(B1), . . . , r˜(Bn)) if B1, . . . , Bn are focal sets ofm
↑(R,r)
1 , . . . ,m
↑(R,r)
n , respectively,
0 otherwise.
Then f is a bijection, because r˜ describes the one-to-one correspondences between the focal sets of m
↑(R,r)
1 , . . . ,m
↑(R,r)
n
and the focal sets of m1, . . . ,mn, respectively, and a jba can take positive values only on n-tuples of focal sets
of the respective marginals. Moreover, mf (J)(∅) = mJ(∅) for all J ∈ J (m1, . . . ,mn), because if B1, . . . , Bn are focal
sets ofm
↑(R,r)
1 , . . . ,m
↑(R,r)
n , respectively, then B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn = ∅ if and only if r˜(B1) ∩ · · · ∩ r˜(Bn) = ∅. Hence,
cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = min
J∈J (m1,...,mn)
mf (J)(∅) = cmin(m↑(R,r)1 , . . . ,m↑(R,r)n ).
If n ≥ 2 and m1 is a specialization of mn, then S(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ S(mn) = S(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ S(mn−1), and therefore
cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = cmin(m1, . . . ,mn−1). By induction it follows that if m1 is a common specialization of m2, . . . ,mn,
then cmin(m1, . . . ,mn) = cmin(m1) = m1(∅). 
Proof of Theorem 7. The first condition for ξ implies in particular 〈m1〉 = ξ(Pl1) = m1, and thus 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 is a
combination rule. The commutativity and quasi-associativity of the rule follow from the commutativity and associativity of
the binary operatoruprise onMS0(S), proved in Theorem 2. The combination rule satisfies the property of absorption (and thus
idempotency), since Theorem 2 implies Pl1 uprise Pln = Pl1 whenm1 is a specialization ofmn, and therefore
〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 = ξ((Pl1 uprise Pln)uprise Pl2 uprise · · ·uprise Pln−1) = ξ(Pl1 uprise Pl2 uprise · · ·uprise Pln−1) = 〈m1, . . . ,mn−1〉
for all n ≥ 2. The rule is also equivariant with respect to vacuous extensions, because
〈m↑(R,r)1 , . . . ,m↑(R,r)n 〉 = ξ((Pl1 ◦ r˜)uprise · · ·uprise (Pln ◦ r˜)) = ξ((Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln) ◦ r˜) = 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉↑(R,r)
for all refinements (R, r) of S, where the second equality follows by induction from Theorem 2, and the third one is implied
by the second condition for ξ . Since
{x ∈ S : (Pl1 uprise · · ·uprise Pln)({x}) > 0} = {x ∈ S : Pl1({x}) > 0}∩· · ·∩{x ∈ S : Pln({x}) > 0} = C(m1)∩· · ·∩C(mn),
the third condition for ξ implies that the combination rule preserves certainty. Finally, the rule generalizes Dempster’s rule
of conditioning, because in the case of conditioning, Pl1 uprise Pl2 = PlI follows from Theorem 4 (where I is the unique jba with
marginalsm1,m2), and thus the first condition for ξ implies that 〈m1,m2〉 = ξ(Pl1) is the normalized version ofmI (when
mI(∅) < 1). 
Proof of Theorem 8. The first condition for χ implies in particular 〈m1〉 = χ(Q1) = m1, and thus 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉 is a
combination rule. The commutativity and quasi-associativity of the rule follow from the commutativity and associativity of
the binary operator∧ on AQ1(S), proved in Theorem 3. Since Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn = Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn−1 when Q1 ≤ Qn and n ≥ 2,
the combination rule satisfies the property of absorption (and thus idempotency). The rule is also equivariant with respect
to vacuous extensions, because
〈m↑(R,r)1 , . . . ,m↑(R,r)n 〉 = χ((Q1 ◦ r˜) ∧ · · · ∧ (Qn ◦ r˜)) = χ((Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn) ◦ r˜) = 〈m1, . . . ,mn〉↑(R,r)
for all refinements (R, r) of S, where the last equality is implied by the second condition for χ . Since
{x ∈ S : (Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn)({x}) > 0} = {x ∈ S : Q1({x}) > 0} ∩ · · · ∩ {x ∈ S : Qn({x}) > 0} = C(m1) ∩ · · · ∩ C(mn),
the third condition for χ implies that the combination rule preserves certainty. Moreover, the rule generalizes Dempster’s
rule of conditioning, because in the case of conditioning, Q1 ∧ Q2 = QI follows from Theorem 5 (where I is the unique jba
with marginals m1,m2), and thus the first condition for χ implies that 〈m1,m2〉 = χ(Q1) is the normalized version of mI
(when mI(∅) < 1). Finally, the first condition for χ implies also that the combination rule generalizes the minimum rule
of possibility theory, since whenm1, . . . ,mn are consonant, Q1 ∧ · · · ∧ Qn is the commonality function associated with the
result of the unnormalized version of that rule, as follows from the expression (5). 
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